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Abstract 
This paper focuses on the time series properties of the level of underpricing of IPO 
shares and volume of initial selling in Hong Kong equity market. Strong 
autocorrelation among the level of underpricing has been identified. Evidence 
suggests that the initial selling volume plays an important role in the relationship. The 
links between underpricing and clustering of IPOs within different industries are weak, 
suggesting the reasons for underpricing are rather related to the market liquidity than 
industry specific risk characteristics. 
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1 Introduction 
IPO underpricing is a well documented fact in many empirical studies in financial 
markets all over the world. During the period from 1990 to 1998, more than $27 
billion were left on the table in U.S. by IPO underpricing (Loughran, Ritter, 2002). 
Although great effort has been made to verify the existence of IPO underpricing and 
other IPO related puzzles, such as long term under performances, it is surprising that 
there is relatively few works on the degrees of IPO underpricing and the reasons for 
the differences in the level of underpricing. 
Meanwhile, clustering, another IPO related question, is less noticed. In a few 
existing works related to IPO clustering (Hoffmann-Burchardi, 2001, Yung et al., 
2006, Alti, 2005), underpricing is always claimed as the result of clustering, in the 
name of information externality and investor sentiment. 
1.1 IPO Underpricing 
An asymmetric information story is a natural first thought that investigator would 
have when it comes to explaining IPO-related phenomena. As in the Akerlof's "Lemon 
market", in a market for newly offered shares the public may know little about the 
firm and its shares. IPO firms may face a consistently pessimistic public who on 
average tend to undervalue the shares. Through the initial public offering, better 
informed investors may take advantage of these pessimistic public by trading the IPO 
shares. At the end, their inside information becomes public, appearing in the trading 
price of the shares in secondary market. 
Another interpretation of the information asymmetric theory is avoidance of the 
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"winner's curse" (Rock, 1986). The best informed investors are not usually the 
successful bidders. The best informed investors do not want to bid for shares because 
the fair price according to their information is lower than the trading price. As a result, 
the successful but uninformed bidders are cursed by paying an extra amount of money 
for some goods which are not worthy. The consequence of "winner's curse" is that the 
uninformed investors will only win when the shares are not so good. 
Since the IPO firms are usually young with relatively opaque information, 
irrational investor story claims that the irrational investors might misperceive the 
value of information and market momentum. Ljungqvist, Nanda and Singh (2004) 
first model the sentiment investors in IPO market. Intuitively, this kind of sentiment or 
irrational investors should die out in financial market and in the long run only rational 
investors will survive. However, existing research (Yan, 2005) presents evidences that 
in a limited arbitrage world, the irrational investors might be able to survive long 
enough to drive prices to an "unreasonable" level for a considerable period 
("bubbles"). 
    The agreement theory is based on the assumption that the issuer wants some 
target investors. The underpricing is purposeful as it serves to attract more investors 
and select the most desirable one. The intentions could be either to attract investors 
who can aid in acquisitions that are being financed by the IPO (Brennan and Franks, 
1997) or to attract investors who are more likely to be favorably disposed to the firm's 
business or methods of management (Stoughton and Zechner, 1997). In both cases, 
the target investor selection will increase the value of the firm. Unlike the information 
asymmetry and sentimental theories, this kind of underpricing is artificial one and the 
degree of underpricing is controlled by the issuer. 
    There are many other interpretations for the IPO puzzles, such as legal problems, 
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price stabilization strategy, and tax issues. However, none of them alone could explain 
the underpricing puzzle. Moreover, most of theoretical works which aim to shed light 
to IPO's underpricing assume that the IPOs are independent in time so that the level of 
underpricing should not show any pattern in time series. As we will see it is not the 
case and the level of underpricing exhibits strong auto-correlation. After all, the 
question is still remaining: Why are IPO shares underpriced? 
1.2 IPO Clustering 
Traditionally the reason for IPO clustering has been always related with the 
industry specific information or investor sentiment. 
Mauer and Senbet (1992) argue that the price exhibited in secondary market of an 
IPO firms can reduce the uncertainty of the following firms going public. Booth and 
Chua (1996) argue that the marginal cost of information can be reduced for firms 
going public at the same time. 
Along the line of the information spillover, Hoffmann-Burchardi (2001) focuses 
on the revelation of a common-value component in the process of price determination, 
and lays emphasis on the importance of information externalities. The price of the 
IPO shares of one firm from a particular industry serves as an indicator of the 
common positive information about the followers in the same industry. 
From the entrepreneur's perspective, Hoffmann-Burchardi claims that a firm with 
utility-maximizing risk-averse characteristic will go public if and only if the 
entrepreneur gains less from the risky cash flow from the firm than selling it to the 
public risk-neutral investors. In his model where firms go public sequentially, one 
after another, the value of the firm is decided by two factors: firm specific factor and 
industry specific factor. There is asymmetric information between the entrepreneurs 
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and investors. The entrepreneur does not know much about industry specific factors, 
while he may be better informed about the firm specific factor. On the other side the 
investors in the market may posses more information about the industry specific 
factor than the issuer. Once the issuer believes the market value is much greater than 
he estimates, which indicate the market is hot, he will sell shares to the market. This 
paper concludes that this story also explains why hot market often coincides with 
greater underpricing. In the market where trading price is greater than that expected 
by issuer the underpricing is more severe for sure. 
Meanwhile, some researches show that time-varying adverse selection, the result 
of information asymmetry, plays a greater role in IPO clustering. 
Benninga, Helmantel, and Sarig (2005) argue that IPO clustering in a particular 
industry is triggered by the firm with the highest cash flow in this industry going 
public, which in turn produces the information of both the firm's value and the 
investment opportunities in this industry. The valuable information about the industry 
prospect being perceived by both investors and private firms serves now as a focal 
point for another agents and leads to clustering. The cluster dies out with the end of 
market optimism. Additionally, Jain and Kini (2005) believe that lower information 
asymmetry between issuers and investors together with an increase in investor 
optimism are also important factors to trigger the IPO cluster. Meanwhile, they claim 
that the downside of the IPO clustering is because of the over investment in the 
industry, which results in a long term under performance. 
Up to my knowledge, the closest research to this paper is one made by Lowry and 
Schwert (2002). This paper directly tests the relation between clustering and 
underpricing level. By examining the sample of IPOs during the period from 1960 to 
1997, they find that the IPO volume and average underpricing are highly 
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auto-correlated, and that the greater number companies tend to go public after periods 
of high IPO underpricing. They conclude that similar types of firms choose going 
public at the same time. More importantly, the offering registration information has an 
effect on the offering price and going public decisions. In their analysis they use the 
average underpricing data for each month instead of the underpricing level of each 
IPO share as we do. Also they do not differentiate between different industry sectors 
except for high tech firms which are insufficient to justify any arguments related to 
the industry specific factor. Their conclusion that "similar" firms choose the same 
time of being public seems to be a premature one. Further more, failing to control the 
influence of initial selling on the initial return leave us with another unanswered 
question: Is the cluster just a gathering of firms or an increase demand for capital? 
1.3 Structure of the Paper 
In this paper, we test our hypothesis in Hong Kong equity market. On one hand, 
overwhelming research has been done in mature financial market, such as United 
States and United Kingdom. However, Hong Kong market is seldom mentioned in the 
existing literatures. It is reasonable to believe that by using the data from Hong Kong 
market, the research could provide new data to extend the existing research. On the 
other hand, it is arguably that the rules for financial market are incomplete and 
changing over time. Applying the data sample from emerging market, such as India 
and Mainland China, the research may be less convincing when we compare the result 
with the existing literatures. 
This paper examines the empirical data to answer the above posed questions. Also, 
it simulates a shock on the underpricing to demonstrate the relationship between 
liquidity and underpricing level. The simulation result suggests that the competition 
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among IPO shares and the effect of liquidity shock is determined by some exogenous 
parameters, but not by the shocks per se. Furthermore, this paper focuses on the 
liquidity shock, and also demonstrates that the clustering is neither the reason for nor 
the result of the severe underpricing. The reasons for the clustering may vary, and 
further investigation is needed but beyond this paper. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data set. Section 3 
shows the result of the empirical analysis. In section 4 discusses results and simulates 
a shock to demonstrate their robustness. Section 5 concludes. 
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2 Data 
The data used in this paper is from Investment Service Centre of Hong Kong 
Exchange and Clearing Limited (http://www.hkex.com.hk/invest/isc.htm) for initial 
public offerings from the November, 1999 to the end of 2005. The offer price, number 
of shares offered and the date of the first trading day of the IPO shares are collected 
from their prospectus in Hong Kong Exchange's public document database. First day 
open price and trading volume are collected from both Datastream Advanced® (DA) 
and Yahoo! Finance (Hong Kong) (hk.finance.yahoo.com), since some trading prices 
are missing from either DA or Yahoo! database. A few trading information are still 
missing from both of them. The information about the industry sector categorization is 
also collected from Datastream Advanced®. Except for internet bubble, none other 
significant bubble was recorded in Hong Kong market and worldwide as well during 
this period. Internet bubble is significantly influential in U.S. financial market, but 
much more moderate in Hong Kong. By considering other industries were not 
significantly influenced by the internet bubble and the availability of the data, the data 
from year of 1999, 2000 and 2001 is included. 
The IPO prospectus before November 1999 is not available on the Hong Kong 
exchange web page. The IPOs after 2005 are not included in this research because of 
blooming of IPOs in both China Mainland and Hong Kong since the beginning of 
2006. 
The interest rate is used as the risk free rate in this paper. The information of 
interested rate are separately collected from The People's Bank of China 
(www.pbc.gov.cn), China's central bank, for one year fixed rate for Yuan (RMB) and 
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Hong Kong Census and Statistic Department (www.censtatd.gov.hk) for Hong Kong 
dollar's "best lending rate". This paper does not take the exchange rates as a risk factor, 
since the exchange rate is almost fixed for both currencies. RMB kept its exchange 
rate to US dollar at the level of 8.27 during the period and Hong Kong dollar was kept 
at the level between 7.758 and 7.799. 
    The underpricing level iUP  is defined as the ratio between the difference 
between first day open price iOPEN  and offering price iOFFER . The market initial 
selling iCAP  is defined as the product between the shares offered iNSHARE  and 
the open price iOPEN . 
i i
i
i
OPEN OFFERUP
OFFER
−=                                 （1） 
×i i iCAP NSHARE OPEN=                                （2） 
I use log market capitalization based on e iLNCAP  to represent market 
capitalization. The number of IPOs tN  , total initial selling volume ( )tLN CAP  in 
every month are used to describe the trend of the IPO market. There are 34 industry 
sectors iINDSECT  with 440 in total plus "unclassified sector" which consists of 50 
firms. 
Table 5.1 provides the descriptive information about the variables used in this 
paper. In the sample period, the average underpricing level is 34.9%. In only one 
extreme case with stock code 8036, "36.com Holding Limited", the underpricing is 
399.0, which is excluded from the descriptive statistics. Some of the data are not 
available, so the number of data is not the same for different variables as it is shown 
in Table 5.1. 
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Table 1 Descriptive Statistics for IPO sample 
Panel A: Basic Information 
 Min Max Mean Std Dev N 
UP -0.96 21.00 0.35 1.94 454 
LN(CAP) 12.90 24.85 18.84 1.70 455 
OFFER 0.10 84.00 1.78 4.46 490 
VLM 14378 3637142272 109492411.9 251435461.2 455 
N_SHARE 4002005 26485944000 423497776.4 1761543296 490 
 
Panel B: Number of IPOs 
Time Window Total No. of IPOs Avg No. of IPOs per 
Month 
Std Var of No. of IPOs 
per Month 
1999 Nov to 1999 End 15 7.00 0.50 
Year 2000 85 7.08 13.36 
Year 2001 88 7.33 17.88 
Year 2002 108 9.00 13.45 
Year 2003 64 5.33 8.97 
Year 2004 66 5.50 12.09 
Year 2005 64 5.33 20.79 
 
 
    The statistic information about the underpricing level and capitalization in 
different industries are listed in Table 5.2. By the sector information provided in 
Datastream, the IPO firms are distributed among 34 industries. The "Unclassified 
cases" are labeled to the firms without sector information in Datastream. 
Among all classified industries, the mean of underpricing level for a particular 
industry is minimal for the industry labeled by "Oil and Gas Producers" and maximal 
for "Travel & Leisure". The greatest averaged underpricing level is in unclassified 
group. Only one firm is in the "Mobile Telecommunications" industry and it has the 
greatest average market capitalization, while the "Chemicals" industry has the lowest 
average capitalization. "Personal Goods" is the largest industry group in our sample, 
except the "Unclassified Cases" group. The numbers of samples vary across different 
industries. 
 
Table 2 Statistic Information across Industries 
UP CAP (million HKD) N 
Industry Sectors 
Min Max Mean Std Dev Min Max Mean 
Std 
Dev 
Valid 
Cases 
 11
 
Electronic, Electrical 
Equip. 
-0.55  0.98  0.03 0.30 146.42 1,456.00 228.00  361.25  17
General Retailers  -0.79  0.28  -0.07 0.37 12.80 1,920.96 456.75  702.81  9
Leisure Goods  -0.03  0.26  0.05 0.09 7.35 1,320.00 397.97  509.57  7
Household Goods  -0.66  4.71  0.33 1.20 27.00 1,952.70 236.96  491.38  16
Mobile 
Telecommunications 
0.10  0.10  0.10 NA 43,895.41 43,895.41 43,895.41  N.A.  1
Software & Computer 
Services 
-0.90  19.59  1.04 3.48 4.48 5,100.00 394.28  905.03  34
General Industrials  -0.20  0.04  -0.02 0.11 51.00 196.00 103.33  64.89  4
Personal Goods  -0.07  0.32  0.06 0.08 21.06 2,272.91 235.30  418.93  37
Technology Hardware 
& Equip. 
-0.10  4.81  0.24 0.85 27.97 12,466.67 720.79  2,241.45  24
General Financial  -0.71  0.90  0.09 0.38 20.30 315.00 85.66  80.42  11
Real Estate  -0.12  0.55  0.13 0.23 0.00 3,820.28 845.78  1,340.05  7
Travel & Leisure  -0.04  9.65  2.47 3.82 51.50 18,400.00 4,655.07  7,573.99  6
Industrial Metals  -0.20  0.27  0.00 0.20 44.00 3,928.94 1,666.49  1,861.13  4
Pharmaceuticals, 
Biotechnology 
-0.02  1.14  0.22 0.33 0.00 2,875.40 285.68  657.71  15
Construction & 
Materials 
-0.69  0.42  0.02 0.22 15.50 600.60 135.92  178.72  14
Industrial 
Transportation 
-0.09  0.10  0.01 0.05 22.00 7,671.40 1,947.08  2,428.96  10
Oil Equipment & 
Services 
0.04  0.88  0.27 0.35 57.60 2,402.37 578.45  1,020.66  4
Food & Drug Retailers  0.05  0.08  0.06 0.02 65.75 607.50 290.52  282.40  3
Support Services  -0.05  3.26  0.32 0.89 39.37 5,120.00 501.92  1,390.44  11
Healthcare 
Equipment, Services 
0.02  1.00  0.33 0.41 74.88 209.30 125.93  52.16  5
Industrial 
Engineering 
0.00  0.65  0.12 0.20 50.40 5,083.68 765.42  1,440.85  13
Automobiles & Parts  0.00  0.37  0.12 0.14 41.86 4,047.70 1,020.93  1,418.04  8
Banks  0.00  0.12  0.03 0.05 2,302.30 62,241.97 21,992.48  24,660.02  5
Media  -0.08  0.51  0.11 0.14 13.67 4,500.00 376.59  887.97  22
Chemicals  -0.94  9.00  1.08 3.52 3.00 103.54 46.50  33.15  5
Food Producers  -0.14  0.41  0.10 0.13 52.20 1,685.17 467.64  547.18  13
Equity Investment 
Instruments 
-0.96  0.52  -0.17 0.45 0.40 326.35 73.91  105.36  11
Mining  0.01  0.42  0.22 0.30 163.70 23,129.42 11,646.56  16,239.22  2
Forestry & Paper  0.27  0.27  0.27 NA 151.20 151.20 151.20  N.A. 1
Beverages  -0.78  0.30  -0.19 0.54 31.54 876.00 378.90  441.69  3
Nonlife Insurance  0.34  0.40  0.37 0.04 594.42 7,272.58 3,933.50  4,722.18  2
Life Insurance  0.02  0.27  0.14 0.18 14,572.87 29,441.18 22,007.02  10,513.48  2
Fixed Line 
Telecommunications 
-0.01  0.13  0.06 0.06 23.26 10,503.40 4,160.63  5,490.69  4
Electricity  0.07  0.14  0.10 0.05 2,760.00 2,851.20 2,805.60  64.49  2
Oil & Gas Producers  -0.65  0.06  -0.19 0.40 10,864.65 28,191.22 20,520.45  8,832.20  2
Unclassified Cases  -0.79  399.00  6.30 
47.3
9 12.10 40,320.00 889.26  4,802.35  59
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3 Empirical Finding 
3.1 Underpricing autocorrelation and capitalization 
impact 
    Since the trading price is immediately effective in the secondary market, the 
issuer will always suffer a loss from selling its shares at price lower than the market 
price with the discount rate equal to the underpricing level. Thus the underpricing 
level is also regarded as the measure for the cost of capital for the issuers. If the issuer 
hopes to sell their shares successfully, the underpricing level must be competitive. 
Examining the aggregated underpricing data series by unit root assumption 
(Phillips-Perron test), I find that the stochastic trend exists in the time series of data 
and this trend should be removed from the underpricing series. Instead of the variable 
iUP , I used the difference in two nearest underpricing level ( )idiff UP  as the 
dependent variable. The same unit root test has been performed on this data set and no 
significant trend is found. Moreover, the initial selling iCAP  of the IPO per se will 
also influent the underpricing level when the liquidity in the market is limited. The 
time series equation I test is as follow. 
0 1
1
ln( )
J
i j i j i hk i
j
diff k diff k CAP p i c ε−
=
= + + + +∑               (3) 
    The test results for various choices of J are shown in Panel A of Table 5.3. The 
results suggest that the influence of J=7 periods backward is significant, and also that 
the iCAP  significantly influents the difference in the underpricing level. The dummy 
variables Y99, Y00, Y01, Y02, Y03, Y04, and Y05 are used to represent the market 
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wide factors in different years. For example, if the IPO takes place in the year 1999, 
Y99 is 1. Otherwise, Y99 is 0. As shown in Table 5.3, none of the year dummy 
variable is significantly influential to the regression. 
    It's interesting that the initial selling positively influents the difference of 
underpricing level, but not the underpricing itself (the last is confirmed by performing 
corresponding test). Supposing that the capitalization is constant and equal to its 
average level, we could expect that idiff  will be zero. So the average underpricing in 
period i will remain the same as the previous one. This result suggests that if the 
selling of IPO shares is continuous without huge jumps the underpricing will remain 
at the same level. The R square in this testing is 0.44 in this regression, suggesting the 
liquidity shock caused by the initial selling and the auto-regression part explain 
considerable part of the change of underpricing. Other factors, such as risk free rates 
(Hong Kong interest rate hki  and Mainland China interest rate cni , are not significant 
in this regression. 
    Time should be another factor in measuring market liquidity. Define it  as the 
time distance between IPO i and i-1. Another regression test is done on the following 
equation: 
0
1
ln( )i j
J
t
i j i j i i
j
diff k diff e k CAP c ε−−−
=
= + + +∑            (4) 
    However, the regression is not significant, and cannot rule out the hypothesis that 
all jk  are statistically zero. This result suggests that the liquidity shock does not 
exist on time scale, but on the scale of sequential IPOs. This finding is interesting as 
well. If the large scale initial selling is regarded as the liquidity shock on the market, 
issues of liquidity should rather be considered on the scale of IPOs' sequences than on 
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the natural calendar time scale. The additional argument could be that investors prefer 
IPOs shares over common ones which are available at any point of time. 
Insignificant influence of interest rate and none existence of time factor in 
underpricing auto-regression together imply that the liquidity here is not the usual 
market liquidity, but rather the capital liquidity for IPO shares. 
Traditionally industry cycles and industry specific risk have been used to explain 
the underpricing and clustering. A similar analysis has been performed within 
different industry sectors to verify the influence of liquidity shocks. The result of this 
testing is shown in Panel B of Table 5.3. Since the analysis is limited by the number 
of samples available in different industry sectors, only four industry sectors with 
significant number of firms are available for performing such regression: "Electronic, 
Electronic Equip.", "Software & Computer Services", "Personal Goods" and "Media". 
No significant relationship is shown among ln( )iCAP  and idiff  variables in any 
of these sectors as we found earlier. This again verifies the finding that the change in 
underpricing is not caused by the business cycles in different industries, change of 
risk factors, or investors' optimistic or pessimistic views about different industries, but 
due to the liquidity shocks. Basically, the IPO shares are chasing the capital by 
changing the underpricing level, regardless their industry sectors. 
Based on the negative coefficients in the auto regression, I found that the 
underpricing level trends to be stable except when great liquidity shock comes. Since 
the calendar time is not involved in this regression, the result does not imply that the 
underpricing will be clustering in time. But the clustering will happen when the IPOs 
come more frequently with greater initial selling. 
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Table 3 Auto-regression of Underpricing Level 
Panel A: Aggregate Level Data 
Dependent Variable: UP 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 a 
Const  ‐51.675 **  ‐51.760 **  ‐52.304 ** ‐53.179**  ‐51.800 * ‐52.245 ** ‐53.10*  ‐54.652*    ‐51.62*
  (15.288)  (15.282)  (15.408)  (15.602)  (15.323)  (15.364)  (15.435 (15.810)  (15.2)
Δf t‐1  ‐0.852 **  ‐0.852 **  ‐0.852 **  ‐0.852 **  ‐0.852 *  ‐0.85 **  ‐0.852*    ‐0.853 *  ‐0.852* 
  (0.057)  (0.057)  (0.057)  (0.057)  (0.057)  (0.057)  (0.057)  (0.057)  (0.056)
Δf t‐2  ‐0.733 **  ‐0.733 **  ‐0.733 **  ‐0.733 **  ‐0.733 *  ‐0.73 **  ‐0.73*    ‐0.734 *  ‐0.733* 
  (0.072)  (0.072)  (0.072)  (0.072)  (0.072)  (0.072)  (0.072)  (0.073)  (0.072)
Δf t‐3  ‐0.613 **  ‐0.613 **  ‐0.614 **  ‐0.614 **  ‐0.613 *  ‐0.61 **  ‐0.61*    ‐0.615 *  ‐0.613* 
  (0.080)  (0.080)  (0.080)  (0.080)  (0.080)  (0.080)  (0.080)  (0.081)  (0.080)
Δf t‐4  ‐0.495 **  ‐0.495 **  ‐0.496 **  ‐0.496 **  ‐0.495 *  ‐0.50 **  ‐0.50*    ‐0.497 *  ‐0.495* 
  (0.083)  (0.083)  (0.083)  (0.083)  (0.083)  (0.083)  (0.083)  (0.084)  (0.083)
Δf t‐5  ‐0.381 **  ‐0.381 **  ‐0.381 **  ‐0.381 **  ‐0.381 *  ‐0.38 **  ‐0.38*    ‐0.382 *  ‐0.381* 
  (0.081)  (0.081)  (0.081)  (0.081)  (0.081)  (0.081)  (0.081)  (0.081)  (0.080)
Δf t‐6  ‐0.256 **  ‐0.256 **  ‐0.256 **  ‐0.256 **  ‐0.256 *  ‐0.26 **  ‐0.26*    ‐0.257 *  ‐0.256*
  (0.072)  (0.072)  (0.072)  (0.072)  (0.072)  (0.072)  (0.072)  (0.073)  (0.072)
Δf t‐7  ‐0.135*    ‐0.135 *  ‐0.135 *  ‐0.135 *  ‐0.135 *  ‐0.14 *  ‐0.14*    ‐0.136 *  ‐0.135* 
  (0.056)  (0.056)  (0.056)  (0.056)  (0.056)  (0.056)  (0.056)  (0.057)  (0.056)
Ln(CAP) t  2.761 **  2.779 **  2.786 **  2.820 **  2.765 *  2.800**  2.85*    2.981 *  2.760* 
  (0.814)  (0.817)  (0.817)  (0.823)  (0.814)  (0.821)  (0.825)  (0.852)  (0.812)
Y99  1.096                0.087     
  (13.947)              (14.200)   
Y00    ‐0.870              ‐1.788     
    (3.070)            (3.698)   
Y01      1.301            0.078     
      (3.891)          (4.417)   
Y02        1.474                      b   
        (3.040)           
Y03          0.588        ‐0.556     
            (4.075)        (4.601)    
Y04            ‐1.907      ‐3.009     
            (5.152)    (5.648)   
Y05              ‐3.417    ‐4.405     
              (5.283)  (5.781)   
R Square  0.435    0.435    0.435    0.435    0.435    0.435    0.435    0.436    0.435 
 
Panel B: Auto‐regression within industries 
Electronic, 
Electrical Equip. 
Software & 
Computer Services 
Personal Goods  Media 
Industry 
Coef  StdError  Coef  StdError Coef 
StdErr
or 
Coef  StdError
Const  0.06  0.12  ‐38.15** 10.45  ‐0.06  0.32  ‐1.81  0.79 
Δf t‐1  ‐1.11  0.57  ‐0.89**  0.17  ‐0.74**  0.22  ‐1.23  0.31 
Δf t‐2  ‐0.48  0.72 
 
‐0.70**  0.22  ‐0.74**  0.28 
 
‐1.16  0.35 
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Δf t‐3  ‐0.11  0.57  ‐0.56  0.24  ‐0.72**  0.29  ‐0.27  0.66 
Δf t‐4  ‐0.22  0.29  ‐0.40  0.23  ‐0.63*  0.30  ‐0.65  0.29 
Δf t‐5  ‐0.22  0.21  ‐0.23  0.22  ‐0.64*  0.30  ‐0.47  0.24 
Δf t‐6  ‐0.15  0.15  ‐0.28  0.20  ‐0.12  0.29  ‐0.74  0.27 
Δf t‐7  ‐0.02  0.12  ‐0.07  0.15  ‐0.09  0.24  ‐0.55  0.29 
Ln(CAP)t  0.00  0.01  2.07**  0.57  0.00  0.02  0.10  0.04 
R Square  0.75    0.44  0.49                  0.97 
 
** Significant at 5% level 
*  Significant at 10% level 
a  The model 1,2,3,4,5, 6 and 7 uses dummy variable of year Y99, Y00, Y01, Y02, Y03, Y04 and Y05 
respectively. Model 8 uses the whole group of dummy variables, while model 9 uses none. 
b  Variable Y02 is excluded because the dummy variable matrix is near singular matrix. 
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3.2 Clustering of Capitalization, Number of IPOs 
Since the severe underpricing level is caused by liquidity shock, the initial selling 
waves (peaks) are crucial to understand the changes in underpricing. 
 
 
Table 4 Auto-regression of Capitalization 
  Coef 
Std 
Error 
Δ(cap) ‐1   ‐0.66  ** 0.06   
Δ(cap) ‐2   ‐0.57  ** 0.08   
Δ(cap) ‐3   ‐0.49  ** 0.09   
Δ(cap) ‐4   ‐0.29  ** 0.06   
Δ(cap) ‐5   ‐0.16  ** 0.06   
R Square  0.27 
**  Significant at 1% level 
 
The clustering can be discovered in the frequencies of IPOs and the average 
initial selling in a longer period. With time window of one month, the number of IPOs 
( tN ) is used to represent the frequency and total initial selling tTCAP  of each month 
and thus get the average initial selling of IPO shares tACAP . The number of IPOs in 
every month is illustrated in Figure 5.1, and the average initial selling in every month 
is presented in Figure 5.2. 
It is interesting that the auto-regression results show that only previous 5 periods 
have significantly influence on the initial selling now, whereas the auto-regression 
result of underpricing shows that previous 7 periods matters. This difference in time 
series indicates that the underpricing have different cycles from initial selling. 
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Figure 1 N of IPOs 
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Figure 2 Average IPO Capitalization 
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A Spearman correlation test among frequencies, average underpricing and 
aggregated initial selling is crucial to find out the relation between clustering and 
underpricing. The result of the correlation test is shown in Table 5.5. This result shows 
that the clustering measured by the number of IPOs, N, is not correlated with the 
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average underpricing level, AUP. The average initial selling of IPO shares of every 
month, ln tACAP , is not correlated with average underpricing of that month, either. 
This evidence is contrary to the predictions of many theoretical papers which 
claim the severe underpricing is either the result of a bubble, or the reason of a 
bubble.  
In some cases, more severe underpricing is observed in the period of IPO 
clustering and seemingly they are related. Especially in 1999, during the "dot-com 
bubble", the average underpricing was 69%. However, the relationship between these 
two variables is not statistically significant in our sample. And thus it is reasonable to 
believe that a severe underpricing is not a necessary consequence of clustering. 
 
 
Table 5 Correlation Test: Clustering and Underpricing 
      N  ln(ACAP)  AUP 
N  Spearmanʹs rho  1.000  ‐0.991** 0.249 
Sig. (2‐tailed)  0.000 0.306 
 
N  74  74 74 
ln(ACAP)  Spearmanʹs rho  ‐0.991** 1.000 ‐0.208 
Sig. (2‐tailed)  0.000  0.075 
 
N  74  74 74 
AUP  Spearmanʹs rho  0.249  ‐0.208 1.000 
Sig. (2‐tailed)  0.306  0.075  
N  74  74 74 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
3.3 Remarks 
Based on the regression result of underpricing, I simulate the time series process 
by injecting a shock of initial selling volume, which is much greater than normal 
initial selling volume. The result is shown in Figure 5.3. The following equations are 
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used for this simulation: 
1i i iup up diff−= +                                  (5) 
7
1
i j i j i
j
diff k diff ε−
=
= +∑                             (6) 
I used for jk  the numbers in Panel A (Table 5.3) and injected one liquidity shock 
of the size -103 at the step i=500. There are in total 1000 steps (periods) in the 
simulation, and we take (0,1)i Nε = . To keep things simple, I initialize the first 7 
period iup  by the first 7 realizations of iε  and eliminate the constant in the first 
order difference equation (3) assuming that the majority of IPO initial sellings are at 
the average level. 
The dotted line in Figure 5.3 is the simulated underpricing level without shock, 
and the continuous line is with shock. The enlarged shock effect can be seen in Figure 
5.4. The first impression is that the shock causes volatility of underpricing level to 
increase, and also moves the underpricing out of its equilibrium level. 
 
Figure 3 Simulation of a Shock in IPO Market 
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3 The particular size of the shock does not change essentially transition path represented in Figure 5.4. 
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Figure 4 Shock Effect: Offsetting Underpricing Level 
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    Noteworthy, the volatility effect of the shock in this simulation will be lasting for 
21 periods after the shock until the volatility reduced to less than 1% of the shock, and 
the length of the period is solely decided by the jk , neither change after the variance 
of iε , nor the size of the shock. The percentage of change as the consequence of the 
shock remains the same when I changed the variance of iε  to 100, or the shock to 1 
and 600. The underpricing level changed by the shock related with the size of the 
shock, but the ratio of the changed level over the size of the shock depends solely on 
jk . 
jk  and the constant in the regression should be varying and intrinsic in different 
market. Recorded by J. Ritter by collecting average initial returns (underpricing) in 39 
countries and areas, Figure 5.5 shows the 5 countries with highest average initial 
return and 5 countries with lowest average initial return. Although the time period 
varies in the average initial return date in different countries, the difference between 
the two groups is clearly shown. The average underpricing level in the 5 lowest 
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countries are 8.40%, while 121.84% in the 5 highest countries. And the countries with 
highest underpricing level are usually those with immature financial market and strict 
capital control, which implies limited capital liquidity and investors' limited ability to 
arbitrage because of capital control. 
 
 
Figure 5 Average Underpricing Level across Countries 
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Data Source: Jay Ritter, IPO Data, http://bear.cba.ufl.edu/ritter/ipodata.htm,2007 
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4 Concluding Discussion 
This paper investigates the IPO underpricing from the perspective of integrated 
primary and secondary market, and documents that the IPO underpricing is 
determined by the previous IPOs' underpricing level for the first time. It implies that 
there is a competition among IPO shares. Note that other outstanding stocks are 
excluded from this competition. 
By analyzing the distinctive feature of IPO cases in Hong Kong from November 
in 1999 to the end of 2005, this paper documents the fact that apart from underpricing, 
there was significant clustering of IPOs over time. Moreover, the level of underpricing 
is closely related to the underpricing level of previous IPOs. This finding suggests that 
the underpricing is strategically arranged by underwriter's syndicate to favor the 
investors. This investigation also reveals that the initial selling volume of IPOs is 
strongly auto-correlated. Together with IPOs' clustering, evidences also suggest that 
the issuers tend to choose the specific time to go public, and an increase in initial 
selling volume leads to more severe underpricing. It could be interpreted as the 
compensation for the liquidity shock caused by supplying a huge amount of shares in 
the market. 
This underpricing competition implies the specific characteristic of IPO shares 
per se, which could be interpreted as a specific risk premium. This characteristic 
might also help us to understand the reason for IPO underpricing within the 
framework of rational investor paradigm in the future research. 
The predictability of IPO underpricing by previous IPO underpricing clearly 
should not be result of investors' sentiment, but rather a reflection of the risk, such as 
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coordination problem in IPO and the compensation of the liquidity shock. The 
coordination risk comes from the asymmetric information, because IPO per se is a 
process of information creating, "information cascade" (Welch, 1992). The 
"information cascades" story claims that investors make their investment decisions 
sequentially. Successful initial sales encourage following investors to revise their own 
information about the share and to invest, and vice versa, unsuccessful initial sales 
discourage the investors. IPO underpricing competition prevents public from 
continuous pessimism. Further investigations are needed to discover the nature of the 
risk associated with IPO shares within the framework of efficient market hypothesis 
(EMH). 
This liquidity shock and IPOs' competition can also explain the severe 
underpricing during the internet bubble period around 1999. Documented by 
Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003), the IPO underpricing is 69% in the year of 1999 
averagely and 56% in 2000, whereas the underpricing in 1996 is only 17% averagely. 
The initial selling of the IPOs is averagely $65.3 million and $124.1 million in 1999 
and 2000, significantly greater than the previous years. In 1996, 1997, 1998, the initial 
selling of IPO shares are $35.3 million, $32.6 million and $51.3 million. From the 
perspective of liquidity, this is exactly the result of the liquidity shock of IPO shares. 
Interestingly, the influence of previous IPOs underpricing level on the following 
one is not subject to the time interval between IPOs. In the regression, the 
underpricing level is not significantly related to the previous one when the time is 
added as a factor. 
The investigation among different industries reveals that the IPO underpricing 
auto-correlation is not statistically significant at the industry level. Clearly the 
changes in IPO underpricing levels are not related with industry specific factors 
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(specific risks), but the market factors (market risk), such as market liquidity. The 
analysis on the initial selling reveals that in the short run, initial selling volume is 
influenced by the previous IPO initial selling volumes. This fact indicates that despite 
the specific industry cycle, issue choose the time to go public mainly relying on 
information related to a few previous IPOs. 
The evidences presented in this paper suggest that the IPO underpricing is 
predictable and the liquidity shocks caused by IPO shares at least partially explain the 
level of underpricing. Further promising investigation should focus on the specific 
risk factors associated with IPO shares. 
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